

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy Director of Security

**FROM :** Assistant Director, Research and Reports

**SUBJECT :** Comments on Revision of DCID 11/2 (Draft 1)

**REFERENCE :** (a) Your Memorandum, dated 10 September 1959,  
Same Subject

(b) [REDACTED] Memorandum on Additional  
Control Marking, dated 22 September 1959

25X1A

1. This Office is in general agreement with the substance of subject draft revision of DCID 11/2 and considers it a commendably lucid presentation of an inherently complex matter; requiring only some editorial polishing.

2. From our viewpoint as finished intelligence producers a major concern is the clearance of information from source documents used in our finished reports -- particularly when the source documents carry the "NOFORN" stamp. Under the proposed revision (ref. a) we believe we will not be unduly burdened or restricted in the dissemination of our finished reports, providing the components issuing "raw" intelligence information really make a predetermination in the spirit of the Directive before applying the "NOFORN" control to their documents. We believe that adherence to this "spirit" is realistically attainable in consideration of the separate controls provided on the passing of documents vs. information and the protection of information on sources and methods.

3. The following editorial-type suggestions are made for clarity in the draft revision:

(a) Remove paragraph 7d under "Use" on page 7 and reinsert it as paragraph 7c under "Document" on page 6.

(b) On page 8, paragraph 11, line 4: insert the word "this" between "of" and "material."

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

4. With regard to the reinstatement of the control stamp, "WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN," we still question the necessity and utility to say nothing of the cumbersome and exact meaning of the control. The control, as defined in reference (b), is less than that provided in "BACKGROUND USE ONLY." Because of the variety of uses that may be desired for such material, and if the source or source information is as super-sensitive as is implied by the proposed "Sensitive Source" stamp, a check back with the issuing agency is probably advisable before further dissemination or use is made of the information. In that in actual practice we would have to check back with the issuing agency of any such "Sensitive Source" information contained in one of our finished intelligence documents, to determine the limits of our dissemination, we believe such "Sensitive Source" information could be effectively controlled by the "BACKGROUND USE ONLY" stamp. If this "Sensitive Source" control stamp is readopted we will probably also have to adopt several other "special stamps" and the simplicity, and therefore the effectiveness, of the Directive will be adversely affected.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND REPORTS:

25X1A

  
Special Assistant to AD/RR

**CONFIDENTIAL**